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important item. A further element which would affect the budget of the new authority is the question of the sinking fund provision which will inevitably have to be introduced at Greenock in substitution for the financial provisions of the Act of 1913, and it seems to us that, if on expert investigation it appears that the new authority must introduce such a sinking fund provision, the purchase consideration for the Greenock undertaking will require to be correspondingly reduced.
(154) It would be useless to disguise that the main difficulty is created by the special position of Greenock as outlined in Paras. (74) to (79). Under their 1939 unification proposals the Clyde Trust proposed to exclude Greenock; and we gathered that, if the Clyde Trust were today promoting a unification scheme with a single eye to financial and commercial considera- tions, they would still exclude Greenock. But the exclusion of Greenock would be incompatible with the unified development of the river and estuary which is widely recognised an imperative in the general interest, and Greenock, if left to face the coming years in isolation, would be left in an increasingly difficult situation.
(155) The Necessary Legislation: The bill to give effect to our proposals, if accpted, would follow the general model of the Port of London Act, 1920, adapted on the lines of the Clyde Navigation Acts to local conditions. We trust that it may be possible to supersede entirely the scores of local and private acts by a self-contained and complete code, though we recognise the difficulties of such consolidation.
Under the 1939 proposals procedure would doubtless have been by way of provisional order promoted by the Clyde Trust. In this instance we venture to urge that procedure should be by way of a public government bill, as in the case of the orginal Port of London Act of 1908. It would, in our view, militate against the success of the entire scheme if it had to be initiated in an atmosphere of heated controversy by a private measure pro- moted by the Clyde Trust as predominant partners in the proposed amalgama- tion, and opposed, at least formally, by the great number of affected interests; nor would it be fair to the Clyde Trust to force them into such a position.
IMPROVEMENT OF FACILITIES
(156) Upon the assumption that changes in the port administration are to be carried into effect more or less on the lines of the recommendations outlined above, we repeat that the responsibility for formulating and carry- ing out, with such adaptations as changing circumstances may dictate, a master plan for the Clyde should rest with the new authority, and that it would be unfair to require them to enter upon their duties with their hands tied. But in executing our remit, we have had brought to our attention from various quarters a number of criticisms of the facilities at present pro- vided at the Clyde ports, and, as these are matters to which immediate and careful consideration will in any event have to be given, we now proceed to summarise the more important points. We should desire, however, that our suggestions and recommendations in regard to these matters should be regarded as provisional and subject to review by the authority or authorities on whom the duty of administering the Clyde will ultimately rest.
(157) There is a general and emphatic demand for additional dry dock facilities on a scale sufficient to accommodate the largest type of vessel built at several of the Clyde yards. With one exception, the only dry docks which at present exist are situated in the upper reaches of the river, and the largest
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is insufficiently large, and allows too small a depth of water at the sill, to accommodate the larger classes of ship, naval or mercantile. It is anomalous that such vessels should be built on the Clyde, but should never be able to return to the Clyde for the periodical repairs and refits for the execution of which there are in other respects available such ample facilities and special
skill.
Associated with the provision of a dry dock of the necessary dimensions, the appeal is made for suitably disposed and suitably equipped Fitting-out and Repair Berths; and for one or more Floating Cranes of large outreach and lifting capacity to be employed on ship repair work and to supplement the cranage facilities at shipbuilding berths and fitting out basins.
For certain of these needs temporary provision was made during the war by the loan of plant from other ports and by plant constructed by the Govern- ment during the war. We feel, however, that in so important a centre of the shipbuilding and engineering industries permanent provision of the best modern facilities ought, if possible, to be made. If such provision is to be made for the accommodation of ships of the largest type, the site would probably have to be in close proximity to open water so as to obviate the difficulties of handling such vessels in a narrow channel.
(158) Provision of such facilities in proximity to the extensive land-locked anchorages of the upper estuary obviously raises the question of the suitability of this area as a site for a naval base. We are not in a position to express any view upon the strategic and naval considerations bearing upon this matter, nor have we sought to explore them; but we have no doubt that the Admiralty is aware of the great possibilities of such a scheme and the many advantages to the Fleet and to the Clyde which it would yield. It appears clear that great economies could be effected, and notable indirect advantages secured, if a dual demand could be met by the single provision of a graving dock and associated works, available, when not required by the Admiralty, for use for mercantile work.
(159) We have also had brought to our notice another project of the highest importance, viz. the handling of the ore imports on which the iron and steel industries, and indirectly the shipbuilding and engineering industries, are dependent. This issue raises questions of the location and organisation of industry extending far beyond the ambit of our remit or the powers of any port authority, but its importance to the future of the Clyde and of industrial Scotland needs no emphasis. It is unfortunately undeniable that, by com- parison with the modern layout of integrated plants as found in America and elsewhere, the location and general design of the Scottish Iron and Steel industries are far from ideal and involve unremunerative costs. Under exist- ing conditions the imported ore has to be discharged at Rothesay Dock and elsewhere by methods which leave much to be desired on the score of efficiency and expedition, thence transported by rail to the iron and steel works, most of which are situated on the far side of the congested industrial areas of Glasgow; and the finished product, if required for shipbuilding, has then to be transported back to the Clyde to be employed as the raw materials of shipbuilding at points not far from the quays at which the ore was discharged. About 15 years ago a joint investigation led to the formulation of an ambitious, but obviously meritorious, project for the creation on the lower part of the River of a complete industrial unit, with deep-water wharves for large ore ships, facilities for discharging their cargoes direct into blast furnaces and thence into steel works and rolling mills, the products of which, finished or semi-finished, would then be available for short transport by barge to the
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